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Breaking the Bank: Split Interpretations of the 
Bank Acts in the Era of #MeToo 
Conor R. Harvey† 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE BANK ACTS 
Many conflicts exist between state anti-discrimination laws and 
federal banking statutes. Traditionally, federal law provided certain 
banks carte blanche to terminate qualifying employees at will, or “at 
pleasure.”1 But some federal courts now afford state law protections to 
these discharged employees through a more nuanced interpretation of 
federal law.2 Today, those courts find that banks do not have an abso-
lute right to fire employees “at pleasure” if the firing violates a state 
anti-discrimination law. Consequently, their interpretations conflict 
with the interpretations of circuits that hold that federal law provides 
certain banks the absolute right to dismiss qualifying personnel “at 
pleasure,” subject only to federal law.3 
Three different statutes encompass the “Bank Acts”: the National 
Bank Act,4 the Federal Reserve Act,5 and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
 
 † B.P.A. 2015, The University of Texas at San Antonio; J.D. Candidate, The University of 
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Daniel Hemel for his advice, guidance, and 
feedback. Additionally, I would like to thank the past and present staff and board of The University 
of Chicago Legal Forum, as well as my fiancé, Tara Haugvoll, for their support. 
 1 This Comment uses the terms “at will” and “at pleasure” synonymously. See Wiersum v. 
U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 492 (11th Cir. 2015) (“At pleasure” was utilized by Congress to 
mean “only that Bank officers are ‘at will’ employees, as opposed to ‘term’ employees.”). 
 2 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006); Kroske v. U.S. Bank 
Corp., 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005); Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 
F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. 
Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 
1995); Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 3 See Wiersum, 785 F.3d 483; Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); 
Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 4 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. (2012). 
 5 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (2012). 
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Act.6 Each of the Bank Acts contains different requirements for govern-
ance. For example, to be governed by the National Bank Act, a bank 
must include the word “National” in its title and must be certified as a 
national banking institution by the comptroller of the currency.7 The 
Federal Reserve Act binds all twelve of the United States Federal Re-
serve Banks.8 And the Federal Home Loan Bank Act governs the eleven 
banks supervised by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.9 
The Bank Acts all contain similar language within what is known 
as their “at-pleasure” provisions,10 and thus, courts often apply juris-
prudence regarding one Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision interchange-
ably with the same provision of another Bank Act.11 These provisions 
allow a bank’s board of directors governed by one of the Bank Acts to 
dismiss certain personnel for whatever reason the board sees fit,12 and 
for the most part, without any legal consequence.13 Under the National 
 
 6 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. (2012). 
 7 12 U.S.C. § 35. 
 8 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522. 
 9 12 U.S.C. § 1442a. 
 10 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 24 (A national banking association “shall have power . . . [t]o elect or 
appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and 
other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such 
officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”) with 12 U.S.C. § 341 
(“[A] Federal reserve bank . . . shall have power . . . to appoint by its board of directors a president, 
vice presidents, and such officers and employees as are not otherwise provided in this Act, to define 
their duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof, and to dismiss at pleasure such 
officers or employees.”). 
 11 Schweikert v. Bank of Am., N.A., 521 F.3d 285, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he at-pleasure pro-
visions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act . . . and the Federal Reserve Act . . . have [been] inter-
preted [ ] consistently with each other and with the at pleasure clause of the [National Bank Act].”); 
Stone v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 92-cv-211, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7927, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 
1996) (“[T]he ‘dismissal at pleasure’ language is nearly identical in all of these federal bank acts. 
Thus, plaintiff cannot avoid [the application of] other cases . . . [because] the employers therein 
were not banks organized under the National Bank Act.”); Farmer v. Nat’l City Corp., c-2-94-966, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21478, at *20–21 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 1995) (finding the “at pleasure” lan-
guage of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the National Bank Act 
are identical). 
 12 This dismissal power extends to other employees in some contexts. Porter Wright, Nat’l 
Bank Act May Preempt Certain Bank Officer Employment Claims, EMPLOYER LAW REPORT (Nov. 
12, 2008), https://www.employerlawreport.com/2008/11/articles/eeo/national-bank-act-may-preem 
pt-certain-bank-officer-employment-claims/ [https://perma.cc/L2XT-PVKN]; see also Schweikert, 
521 F.3d at 290 (“We hold that ratification by a board of directors of a termination is sufficient to 
invoke the preemptive effect of the at-pleasure provision of the [National Bank Act].”). Contra 
Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1032–33, 1036 (Cal. 1991) (“Board action of 
many kinds is often ratification of recommendations by senior management. But the board re-
mains responsible for performing its statutory and other functions . . . If [the National Bank Act] 
unreasonably requires such a function to be carried out by a bank’s board, the remedy lies with 
Congress, not with this court.”). 
 13 Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank, 418 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“The provision for 
dismissal of officers at the pleasure of the board of directors has been construed consistently to 
allow a national bank to discharge an officer without liability.”); see also Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l 
Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524–25 (9th Cir. 1989); Kozlowsky v. Westminster Nat’l Bank, 6 Cal. App. 3d 
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Bank Act, these employees include presidents, vice presidents, and 
other officers of qualifying banks.14 The Federal Reserve Act extends 
dismissal to additional employees.15 Moreover, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act allows for the “at-pleasure” dismissal of attorneys and 
agents.16 Today, in the era of #MeToo, an interesting question is 
whether a board’s power to dismiss personnel at will preempts state 
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or other personal 
characteristics.17 
This Comment argues that the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions 
preempt all contradictory state laws.18 However, the Bank Acts should 
be amended to allow plaintiffs to bring state law discrimination claims 
that parallel—or exactly match—their federal counterparts. Part II of 
the Comment explores the origin and purpose of the “at-pleasure” pro-
vision. Part III provides a quick overview of anti-discrimination provi-
sions and their applications and interactions with at-will employment. 
Part IV discusses the Supremacy Clause and the preemption doctrine 
as lenses through which to view this issue. Part V dives into the inter-
section of state law claims and the supremacy of the Bank Acts. Part VI 
discusses solutions to discrimination in the era of #MeToo when feder-
alism preempts state law anti-discrimination provisions. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE “AT-PLEASURE” PROVISION 
The “at-pleasure” provision was first introduced in 1863 as part of 
the National Currency Act.19 Congress left “no record of any discussion 
of [the ‘at-pleasure’ provision], or of any specific purpose or motive it 
 
593, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); First Nat’l Bank of Colquitt v. Miller, 98 S.E. 402, 404–05 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1919); Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), aff’d, 173 
N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1930); Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122–23 (8th Cir. 1896). 
 14 12 U.S.C. § 341. 
 15 See Little v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 601 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1985) 
(determining the Federal Reserve Bank could fire a security guard at pleasure under the Federal 
Reserve Act); Obradovich v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 569 F. Supp. 785, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(holding that a painter whose duties did “not seem essential to the Federal Reserve’s discharge of 
its financial responsibilities” could be dismissed at pleasure). 
 16 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2012). 
 17 See, e.g., Boesch v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 2008 Ohio 3282 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (finding a 
bank officer’s gender discrimination claim brought under state law was preempted by the NBA). 
 18 Courts interpreting the “at pleasure” language in the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal 
Home Loan Act look to the interpretation of the National Bank Act’s nearly identical provision to 
identify the preemptive scope of all three federal banking act provisions. See, e.g., Fasano, 457 
F.3d at 286–87. This interpretative method is supported by congressional intent. Decades after the 
National Bank Act, when enacting the Federal Reserve Act, Congress specified that the purpose 
of the “at-pleasure” provision was “precisely analogous to those of the national banks.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 63-69 (1913). 
 19 Act of Feb. 25, 1863 ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668 (1863). 
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might have had in enacting it.”20 Yet as courts21 and commentators22 
have noted, historical context suggests that the provision served a 
“quite narrow” purpose.23 Its purpose is likely derivative of the National 
Currency Act’s purpose, which some have argued Congress passed to: 
(1) develop a national currency; (2) create a federal bond market to fi-
nance the Civil War; and (3) establish a nationally governed depository 
for government funds.24 But the oldest commentator argues that the 
National Currency Act, subsequently the National Bank Act once 
amended in 1864,25 was passed “to create a market for loans of the gen-
eral government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation of a 
currency based upon the credit of the government.”26 Although state 
bank notes are obsolete today—long ago replaced by federal currency—
federal banks faced fierce competition from state banks during the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century.27 Congress appeared “solicitous of 
the new national banks, their competitiveness, and ultimately, the sys-
tem’s survival,”28 going as far as to enact a ten percent tax on all bank 
notes issued by state-chartered banks in an effort to make national 
banks competitive.29 The tax proved so successful that it was later con-
sidered to have taxed the state banks out of existence.30 
Although the congressional record lacks any discussion of the Na-
tional Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, some courts argue that Con-
gress intended it “to place the fullest responsibility upon the directors 
 
 20 Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Miriam Jacks Achtenberg, Rereading the Nat’l Bank Act’s ‘At Pleasure’ Provision: Preserv-
ing the Civil Rights of Thousands of Bank Employees, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 172 (2008). 
 23 Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (interpreting the Federal Reserve Act’s identical language). 
 24 Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking Sys., 
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical 
Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983); CHARLES THEODORE BOONE, THE LAW OF 
BANKS AND BANKING 290 (1892). 
 25 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 88, 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq.) 
(“[A] national banking association . . . shall have power . . . to elect or appoint directors, and by its 
board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their 
duties, required bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at 
pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.”). 
 26 BOONE, supra note 24, at 290. 
 27 See Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412 (1873) (describing the National 
Bank Act’s pro-competitive policies); M.B.W. Sinclair, Employment at Pleasure: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Passed, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 531, 533 (1991). 
 28 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 533. 
 29 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 93, 146 (1866); see also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of the tax). 
 30 BOONE, supra note 24, at 290 (quoting Tiffany, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 413) (“Much has ac-
cordingly been done to insure their national banks’ taking the place of state banks. The latter, it 
is said, ‘have been substantially taxed out of existence.’”). 
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[of national banks] by giving them the right to discharge [ ] officers at 
pleasure.”31 Specifically, “the power to dismiss bank officers at will re-
flects the constitutional mandate to establish an independent national 
system in order to maintain the stability of, and promote the welfare of, 
the national banks.”32 Furthermore, it empowers banks to immediately 
remove questionable individuals on the basis that a strong public image 
is important to a bank’s prosperity.33 Although simple,34 this argument 
is nevertheless valid. Because banks profit by caring for their custom-
ers’ money, untrusting customers will withdraw that money, and the 
banks’ prosperity will leave with it.35 While national banks no longer 
need a competitive advantage over state banks, customers simply will 
not deposit money in institutions they do not trust. Whether that trust 
is lost by a bank officer’s actual misbehavior, mismanagement, or by 
some fiction, the same result occurs: less money is deposited and less 
prosperity is achieved. Federal deposit insurance may mitigate the ef-
fects of untrusting customers; however, it likely cannot eliminate their 
fears altogether.36 
Their effectiveness aside, the “at-pleasure” provisions remain 
largely untouched since their enactments and continue to serve their 
alleged purpose.37 Yet, lacking other evidence and left with this broad 
purpose, some courts interpret the provisions according to their more 
tailored views. Until relatively recently, courts truly and consistently 
upheld a bank’s right to discharge its officers “at pleasure.” But in the 
 
 31 Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank, 229 A.D. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930), aff’d, 173 N.E. 898 
(N.Y. 1930). But see Note, Statutory Provision for Removal of Corporate Officer “At Pleasure”, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1937) (characterizing Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (8th Cir. 
1896), similar interpretation of the purpose of the “at-pleasure” provision as “conjecture”). 
 32 Alegria v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 723 P.2d 858, 860 (Idaho 1986) (citing Westervelt, 76 F. 
at 122). 
 33 See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“Observation and experience alike teach that it is essential to 
the safety and prosperity of banking institutions that the active officers, to whose integrity and 
discretion the moneys and property of the bank and its customers are instructed, should be subject 
to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness or negligence attaches to them. High 
credit is indispensable to the success and prosperity of a bank.”); Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 
867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (The purpose of the provision is to give national banks “the 
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the 
public trust.”). 
 34 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 534. 
 35 Id. 
 36 For example, because federal deposit insurance insures up to $250,000, adjusted for infla-
tion, a person with funds exceeding $250,000 may choose to place that money elsewhere. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821 (2012). Moreover, 27 percent of millennials think Bitcoin is more trustworthy than incum-
bent banks, such as JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs. Blockchain Capital, 
Bitcoin Survey Fall 2017, http://www.survey.blockchain.capital/#1509374164943-0459e9 
29-976e [https://perma.cc/V2F2-MQWX]. 
 37 See Westervelt, 76 F. at 122 (“to provide for [the lack of public confidence in a bank officer]”). 
Remember, courts interpret the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions analogously. See Fasano v. 
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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era of #MeToo and other anti-discriminatory movements, courts might 
view the “at-pleasure” provisions from a different perspective. 
III. EMPLOYMENT “AT PLEASURE” AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
PROVISIONS 
Traditionally, at-will,38 or “at-pleasure,”39 employment barred a 
“claim of entitlement to continued employment enforceable against the 
employers.”40 However, the Supreme Court has upheld some re-
strictions on these employment relationships.41 Various state laws have 
forbidden employment discrimination since the 1940s, and similar fed-
eral statutes have done so since the 1960s.42 Today, federal statutory 
restrictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of age,43 physical disa-
bility,44 “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”45 wage garnish-
ment,46 “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”47 mili-
tary status,48 jury duty,49 and a myriad of other classifications50 that 
limit an employer’s ability to fire an employee at will. Many of these 
federal anti-discrimination statutes contain express anti-preemption 
provisions that preserve parallel state laws and remedies.51 Yet no such 
provision exists in any of the three Bank Acts. Consequently, courts of-
ten struggle to properly apply the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions. 
While “[a]ll courts recognize that, to the extent that the federal banking 
 
 38 Black’s Law Dictionary, (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw BLACKS (“Employment that 
is usu. undertaken without a contract and that may be terminated at any time, by either the em-
ployer or the employee, without cause.”). 
 39 “That Congress used the term ‘at pleasure’ instead of ‘at will’ in the National Bank Act is 
not surprising. The term ‘at will’ would not be employed for more than a decade after Congress 
passed the National Bank Act.” Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 172. 
 40 Cherin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 41 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding a federal 
restriction on employment at will that sought to balance the relationship between employers and 
employees). 
 42 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1945, ch. 118, 1945 N.Y. Laws 457; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. 
L. No. 88-353, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 43 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012). 
 44 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (2012). 
 45 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012). 
 46 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2012). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 48 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012). 
 49 28 U.S.C. § 1975 (2012). 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (protecting employees under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3608 
(2012) (providing employee protection in asbestos actions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997d (2012) (providing 
protection to employees reporting the mistreatment of an institutionalized person). 
 51 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. 
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acts conflict with subsequently enacted anti-discrimination laws, sub-
sequent federal anti-discrimination law must prevail,”52 courts often 
split with one another when attempting to simultaneously apply the 
“at-pleasure” provisions and state anti-discrimination statutes. 
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
National State Bank v. Long53 explains that “whatever may be the 
history of federal-state relations in other fields, regulation of banking 
has been one of dual control since the passage of the National Bank Act 
in 1863.”54 Still, since as early as 1819, the Supreme Court has main-
tained that nationally chartered banks are federal instrumentalities 
entitled to regulate themselves without state interference.55 State laws 
only apply to a bank governed by the Bank Acts insofar as the laws do 
not “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on 
the performance of the bank’s functions.”56 Therefore, otherwise valid 
state law discrimination claims must be dismissed if they conflict with 
the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions. Nevertheless, because courts 
exercise substantial discretion in determining whether a state and fed-
eral law conflict, and consequently, whether a federal law preempts a 
state law, some state law discrimination claims proceed despite being 
barred by the “at-pleasure” provisions. 
Federal preemption, read from the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution,57 requires reviewing courts to examine congressional intent58 
and the “purpose of the disputed federal statute.”59 Preemption exists 
in three different forms: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; 
and (3) conflict preemption.60 First, express preemption occurs when 
Congress explicitly defines the “extent to which its enactments pre-
empt state law.”61 An explicit congressional preemption of state laws 
 
 52 Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 167 (emphasis in original). 
 53 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 54 Id. at 985. 
 55 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). 
 56 Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944); see also Barnett Bank, N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (“Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair signifi-
cantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to deprive States 
of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of power.”); Aalgaard v. Merch. Nat’l Bank, Inc., 
224 Cal. App. 3d 674, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 57 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land.”). 
 58 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Aalgaard, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 686. 
 59 Goonan v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 60 Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542–43 (Cal. 2000). 
 61 Id. 
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that regulate banks is a rare occurrence.62 The “at-pleasure” provisions 
do not expressly preempt state anti-discrimination laws and courts are 
generally left to determine the proper boundaries and application of fed-
eral and state laws.63 
Second, field preemption occurs when a state law “regulates con-
duct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to oc-
cupy exclusively.”64 Congressional “intent may be inferred from a 
‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ or 
where an Act of Congress ‘touches a field in which the federal interest 
is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject.’”65 In 1869, the Supreme 
Court noted that national banks were “subject to the laws of the State 
and are governed in their daily course of business far more than the 
laws of the State than of the Nation.”66 Since then, it has generally been 
accepted that the Bank Acts do not employ field preemption.67 Conse-
quently, courts recognize the “historic dual regulation of banks by state 
and federal law.”68 
Third, conflict preemption occurs when a state law “actually con-
flicts” with a federal law.69 The Supreme Court recognizes that “‘federal 
 
 62 See Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“In only a few instances has 
Congress explicitly preempted state regulations of national banks. More commonly, it has been 
left to the courts to delineate the proper boundaries of federal and state supervision.”). 
 63 See id.; Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 491 (2013) (“The [Federal Reserve Act] contains no 
such express preemption clause and does not, by its plain language terms, speak to state-antidis-
crimination laws.”); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000); see also, e.g., Cham-
ber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594–95 (2011). 
 64 Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542; see also Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 
31 (1996); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990). 
 65 English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 66 First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1869). 
 67 Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995) (“[A] state may attempt to affect the conduct of [national] bank officials so 
long as the exercise of their authority does not conflict with, or frustrate the purposes of federal 
law or impair the efficiency of banks to perform their statutory duties.”); see also Wells Fargo Bank 
N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Since shortly after the Bank Act was enacted 
in 1864, the Supreme Court has oft reiterated that federal substantive authority over national 
banks is not exclusive.”). 
 68 Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Nat’l State Bank v. 
Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in 
other fields, regulation of banking has been one of dual control since the passage of the first Na-
tional Bank Act.”); Idaho v. Sec. Pac. Bank, 800 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D. Idaho 1992) (“It is clear that 
Congress has not completely preempted the entire banking field.”). 
 69 Peatros, 990 P.2d at 542–43; see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (Con-
flict preemption “occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when 
the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objective of Congress.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted 
if that law actually conflicts with federal law[.]”). 
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law may be in irreconcilable conflict with state law,’ such that ‘[c]ompli-
ance with both statutes’ results in a ‘physical impossibility,’ and 
caus[es] the state law to stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”70 The 
Bank Acts neither employ express preemption nor exclusively occupy 
the field of banking regulation; consequently, conflict preemption must 
apply, voiding state laws “if they conflict with federal law, frustrate the 
purposes of[,] . . . or impair the efficiency of national banks to discharge 
their duties.”71 
V. THE INTERSECTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS AND THE SUPREMACY 
OF THE BANK ACTS 
Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination often pursue claims 
under both state and federal law. Federal circuit courts—as well as 
many federal district courts—are split concerning whether the Bank 
Acts preempt state anti-discrimination laws.72 While similarities often 
exist between federal and state anti-discrimination laws, the laws are 
not always identical. These differences often result in drastically differ-
ent outcomes for plaintiffs depending on the location where a cause of 
action arises. Consequently, if a uniform preemption application is to 
be applied, the Supreme Court will need to clarify the extent to which 
the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt contradictory state laws. 
If the “at-pleasure” provisions are read according to their plain 
text,73 then it follows that the Bank Acts preempt all state law discrim-
ination claims. Despite this, not all courts adopt such a textualist 
 
 70 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnett Bank, 
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996)); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 
141, 153 (1982). 
 71 Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 561 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Barnett Bank, 517 
U.S. at 33–37 (holding that a federal statute granting national banks authority to sell insurance 
conflicts with, and therefore preempts, state laws forbidding national banks from selling insur-
ance); Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377–79 (1954) (determining that the power 
of national banks to receive deposits conflicts with, and therefore preempts, a state statue prohib-
iting the use of the word “savings” in banking advertisements); Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 
321 U.S. 233, 248–49 (1944) (holding that a state law allowing the transfer of abandoned bank 
deposits was not preempted because “national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws 
infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden on them”). 
 72 See, e.g., Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950 (E.D. Ark. 
Jan. 10, 2013); Risinger v. HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 21, 2011); Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 
2009); Crowe v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009); James v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 471 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 3, 1995); Booth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 900 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Moodie v. Fed. Re-
serve Bank of N.Y., 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 73 See Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank in Newton, 418 N.E.2d 819, 171–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) 
(“[T]he words “dismiss * * * at pleasure” should be taken to signify exactly that, as courts in many 
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view.74 The circuits take one of three approaches: (1) total preemption; 
(2) retail preemption; and (3) wholesale preemption.75 The Fourth, 
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the total preemption approach.76 
Total preemption requires that the “at-pleasure” provisions preempt 
contradictory state laws without question, even if the state statutes are 
consistent with federal law.77 The Ninth Circuit follows the retail 
preemption approach.78 Retail preemption requires that a federal law 
preempt a state law only to “the minimum extent necessary,” as long as 
the state law “substantively mirrors” the federal law.79 Finally, the 
Third Circuit follows the wholesale preemption approach.80 Wholesale 
preemption requires that federal laws preempt state laws that do not 
“exactly match” their federal counterparts; that is, the discrimination 
causes of actions and remedies under state law must be exactly the 
same as those allowed for under federal law.81 
Moreover, numerous federal district courts in circuits that have not 
addressed the preemption issues of the Bank Acts fall within those cat-
egories. It is important to note these district court rulings because those 
rulings may indicate which preemption theory a circuit court will em-
ploy. For example, in Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,82 
the Third Circuit “count[ed] [itself] fortunate to have the benefit of a 
very well-reasoned opinion of Judge Padova of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania”83 from Evans v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.84 
 
jurisdictions have said for over a century.”). 
 74 See generally Kroske, 432 F.3d 976; Morris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950; Ewing, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 707; James, 471 F. Supp. 2d 226; Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No. 
C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007); Moodie, 835 F. Supp. 751. 
 75 Another approach, proposed by three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court of California, 
strongly suggests that later-enacted federal anti-discrimination regulations do not impliedly 
amend the Federal Reserve Act. This would immunize the Federal Reserve Banks from any liabil-
ity under Title VII, the American with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, and other federal anti-discrimination statutes. No federal courts have adopted this approach. 
See Peatros, 990 P.2d 539, 183–89 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 76 See Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am., 
N.A., 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); Ana Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th 
Cir. 1987). 
 77 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]otal preemp-
tion holdings suggest that any state-created limitation on the bank’s power would fundamentally, 
and irreconcilably, conflict with Congress’s intent to grant total, unlimited discretion.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 78 See Kroske, 432 F.3d 976 (2005). 
 79 Id. at 986–87. 
 80 See Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 81 Id. at 274. 
 82 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 83 Id. at 287. 
 84 No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004). 
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Thus, district court decisions occasionally predict how an undecided cir-
cuit might resolve preemption or provide a roadmap for a circuit court 
that has not considered the issue. 
A. Total Preemption (Followed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits) 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the 
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions completely forbid state law prohibi-
tions that limit a qualifying bank’s ability to discharge certain person-
nel. In Ana Leon T. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,85 one of the 
older cases concerning the Bank Acts’ preemption of state law, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provi-
sion preempted state law discrimination claims.86 Plaintiff Ana Leon T., 
a woman of Colombian origin and former employee of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, filed an action under both Title VII and Michi-
gan’s Elliott-Larsen Act87 for wrongful discharge based on her national 
origin.88 With little analysis, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Fed-
eral Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision prevented a bank employee 
from stating a claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act, a statute pro-
hibiting employers from discriminating against employees on the basis 
of national origin.89 Despite its lack of analysis, the Sixth Circuit ruled 
broadly: the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “preempts 
any state-created employment right to the contrary.”90 
The Ana Leon T. ruling was not met without criticism. For in-
stance, in Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,91 the North-
ern District of Illinois criticized “[t]he Leon court [for] provid[ing] no 
reasons or policy for its holding.”92 The Southern District of New York 
refused to follow the decision because “the Sixth Circuit’s pronounce-
ment [in Ana Leon T.] gives no basis for its opinion and sets forth no 
policy reasons for its holding.”93 Moreover, in White v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland,94 the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he Sixth 
 
 85 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 86 Id. at 931. 
 87 MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (2018). 
 88 See generally, Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 928. 
 89 MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a); Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 929–31. 
 90 Ana Leon T., 823 F.2d at 931 (emphasis added); accord Kispert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of 
Cincinnati, 778 F. Supp. 950, 952–53 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (determining the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted a state claw claim for age discrimination). 
 91 No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995). 
 92 Id. at *6. 
 93 Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 831 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 94 660 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
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Circuit . . . failed to engage in any analysis or state the basis of its deci-
sion.” Thus, the Ohio court “decline[d] to rely upon the holding in Ana 
Leon T.”95 Despite these criticisms and the passage of nearly twenty 
years, the Sixth Circuit has since reiterated its holding in Ana Leon T. 
that the “at-pleasure” provision preempts all state law employment dis-
crimination claims.96 Similarly, before Ana Leon T., in Wiskotoni v. 
Michigan National Bank-West,97 the Sixth Circuit observed that the 
National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision “has consistently been con-
strued by both federal and state courts as preempting state law govern-
ing employment relations between a national bank and its officers and 
depriving a national bank of the power to employ its officers other than 
at pleasure.”98 
Likewise, in Schweikert v. Bank of America, N.A.,99 the Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision 
preempted the state law claims before the court.100 Plaintiff Schweikert, 
a bank officer, was terminated by his former employer’s board of direc-
tors for failing to cooperate with both internal and external investiga-
tions of the bank.101 Schweikert sued the Bank of America, alleging 
wrongful or abusive discharge.102 Relying on the National Bank Act’s 
“at-pleasure” provision, the district court dismissed Schweikert’s action 
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.103 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit 
noted that it previously interpreted the analogous “at-pleasure” provi-
sion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act in a wrongful discharge action 
based on state law.104 This precedent—Andrews v. Federal Home Loan 
Bank of Atlanta105—concluded that “Congress intended for federal law 
to define the discretion which the Bank may exercise in the discharge 
of employees.”106 Any wrongful termination claim under state law 
 
 95 Id. at 495. 
 96 See Arrow v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 358 F.3d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]nasmuch 
as Arrow was an employee of a Federal Reserve Bank, her rights under Kentucky state law were 
preempted by federal law.”). 
 97 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 98 Id. at 387; accord Arrow, 358 F.3d at 394. 
 99 521 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 100 Id. at 288–89; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stockwell, 675 So. 2d 584, 586 
(Fla. 1996) (Prior to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the “at-
pleasure” provision precludes any “limitation on the power of a bank to remove its officers” under 
the National Bank Act). 
 101 Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 287. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See generally id. 
 104 Id. at 288 (citing Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atl., 998 F.2d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 
1993)). 
 105 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 106 Id. at 220. 
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“would plainly conflict with the discretion accorded the Bank by Con-
gress.”107 Consequently, and consistent with Andrews,108 the Fourth 
Circuit held that “the at-pleasure provision of the National Bank Act 
preempts state law claims for wrongful discharge.”109 
Finally, in Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,110 a succinct opinion citing 
Wiskotoni,111 the Eleventh Circuit joined the Sixth and Fourth Cir-
cuits.112 Plaintiff Wiersum alleged wrongful termination by U.S. Bank, 
N.A. under the Florida Whistleblower Act113 for his discharge after he 
objected to certain activities that he believed were unlawful and refused 
to participate in them.114 After noting that several circuits, as well as 
the Supreme Court of Florida, had found conflict preemption between 
similar state laws and the Bank Acts, the Eleventh Circuit followed suit 
in finding preemption without providing much reasoning of its own.115 
Together, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits constitute the 
three circuits that provide for the Bank Acts’ total preemption of state 
law. The total preemption approach is alive and well, and its position 
as the approach followed by the most circuits suggests it might be 
adopted by other courts in the future that have yet to rule upon the 
proper application of the “at-pleasure” provisions. 
B. Retail Preemption (Followed by the Ninth Circuit) 
In Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp.,116 the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts state 
law, ultimately rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s “summary conclusion” in 
Ana Leon T.117 Plaintiff Kroske, a bank officer, alleged that the bank 
terminated her in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimi-
nation, a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment.118 
Although Kroske did not pursue a claim under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act,119 or any federal claim at all,120 the court concluded 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 998 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 109 Schweikert, 521 F.3d at 288–89. 
 110 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 111 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 112 Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 491. 
 113 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(3) (2018). 
 114 Wiersum, 785 F.3d at 486. 
 115 Id. at 489–91. 
 116 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 117 Id. at 980–89. 
 118 Id. at 978; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010 et seq. (2018). 
 119 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (2012). 
 120 The court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); Kroske, 432 F.3d at 979. 
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that the National Bank Act did not preempt her claim.121 Instead, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act impliedly amended the Na-
tional Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision to “the minimum extent nec-
essary” to resolve contradictory federal laws.122 Furthermore, the court 
reasoned that because Kroske’s state law claim under the Washington 
Law Against Discrimination “substantively mirrored” a federal claim 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the National Bank 
Act did not preempt her state claim.123 Although the Ninth Circuit 
failed to define its “substantively mirrors” standard, it explained that 
“state law provisions prohibit[ing] termination on grounds more expan-
sive than the grounds set forth in federal law” remain preempted.124 
While district courts in the Second Circuit have reached conflicting 
decisions as to whether the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions preempt 
state anti-discrimination law, they have more recently followed the re-
tail preemption approach. For example, in James v. Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York,125 the Eastern District of New York adopted the Su-
preme Court of California’s retail preemption approach, concluding that 
federal law preempts state law to the extent that the laws conflict, but 
that federal law does not preempt state law to the extent that the laws 
do not conflict.126 And as of yet, the Southern District of New York 
seems to agree. In Moodie v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,127 the 
court held that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision did not 
preempt the New York State Human Rights Law because “Congress did 
not intend the Federal Reserve Act to preempt state anti-discrimination 
 
 121 Kroske, 432 F.3d at 987, 988 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 102 (1983) 
(noting that its “conclusion is buttressed by the ‘importance of state fair employment laws to the 
federal enforcing scheme’” and that “parallel state anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made 
part of the enforcement scheme of federal laws”)). 
 122 Id. at 986. 
 123 Id. at 987; see also Anderson v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 336 F.3d 924, 926 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (stat-
ing the Washington Law Against Discrimination “tracks federal law”); Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget 
Sound, Inc., 753 P.2d 517, 520 (Wash. 1988) (holding that because the Washington Law Against 
Discrimination “does not provide any criteria for establishing an age discrimination case,” Wash-
ington courts look to federal cases construing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 124 Kroske, 432 F.3d at 989. Beyond the “substantively mirrors” standard, at least one federal 
district court in a circuit yet to rule on this issue, without citing any other court’s opinion on this 
issue, determined that the “at-pleasure” provision of the National Banking Act does not preempt 
a retaliatory discharge claim because public policy favors allowing such a claim. See Ruisinger v. 
HNB Corp., No. 10-2640-KHV/KMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148560, at *13 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2011) 
(citing Sargent v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Enid, 809 P.2d 1298, 1301–02 (Okla. 1991)). 
 125 471 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 126 James, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 236; see also Peatros v. Bank of Am., 990 P.2d 539, 553 (Cal. 
2000) (“In a preemption case . . . state law is displaced only to the extent that it actually conflicts 
with federal law. This rule [is] that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a statute 
further than necessary to dispose of the case before it.” (citing Dalton v. Little Rock Family Plan-
ning Servs., 516 U.S. 474, 476 (1995) (per curiam)). 
 127 835 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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laws that are consistent with federal anti-discrimination legislation.”128 
Moreover, the court found that Title VII made no mention of exempting 
qualifying bank personnel from the act’s requirements.129 Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
is subject to New York anti-discrimination laws to the extent that those 
laws are analogous to federal law.130 The Southern District of New 
York’s decision in Moodie backtracks on Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home 
Loan Bank of New York,131 an earlier decision from the same district. 
There, the court held that a New York state human rights agency could 
not pursue a state claim against a national bank because the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempted the cause of 
action.132 
Similarly, the Northern District of California determined that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corporation133 allows 
courts to “limit relief for [a] Plaintiff’s [state law discrimination] claims 
against Defendant [Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco] to that 
which is available under Title VII.”134 When adopting this approach, the 
Southern District of Iowa described it as the “most consistent with the 
law of conflict preemption.”135 And the Eastern District of Arkansas, 
following Ewing v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines,136 noted 
that “[t]he relevant inquiry is the variance” between the federal and 
state anti-discrimination laws at issue, “and whether [the state law] 
conflicts with [the federal law] such that all or part of [the state law] is 
preempted.”137 To the Eastern District of Arkansas, such a conflict must 
make a legal difference in the case,”138 which did not include “differing 
statutes of limitation, exhaustion requirements, punitive damages 
caps, and permissible liability against supervisors under Arkansas law 
[but not federal law].”139 Despite such differences, the Eastern District 
 
 128 Moodie, 835 F. Supp. at 753. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 726 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 132 Id. at 98. 
 133 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 134 Lambright v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., No. C074340CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91075, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007). 
 135 Ewing v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 645 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (S.D. Iowa 2009). 
 136 645 F. Supp. 2d 707 (S.D. Iowa 2009). 
 137 Morris v. U.S. Bank, No. 4:12-cv-281-DPM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3950, at *5 (E.D. Ark. 
Jan. 10, 2013). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at *6. 
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of Arkansas characterized the state anti-discrimination law as a 
“mere[] echo[] of Title VII.”140 
In Katsiavelos v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,141 the Northern 
District of Illinois held that the bank was subject to the Illinois Human 
Rights Act,142 a statute containing anti-discrimination provisions mod-
eled after federal anti-discrimination law.143 The district court disa-
greed with the Sixth Circuit’s Ana Leon T. ruling, finding that the Fed-
eral Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision preempts only contractual 
rights and not other, non-contractual federal or state rights in employ-
ment.144 In fact, the Northern District of Illinois criticized the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s Ana Leon T. decision, claiming that the ruling “provided no rea-
sons or policy for its holding that all state employment rights were pre-
empted by the dismiss at pleasure language.”145 In doing so, the North-
ern District of Illinois determined that “dismiss at pleasure is analogous 
to dismiss at will, implying the absence of a contractual relationship 
between employer and employee. The right to be free from discrimina-
tion is not a contractual right, and therefore is not necessarily embodied 
in the dismiss at pleasure language.”146 
C. Wholesale Preemption (Followed by the Third Circuit) 
In Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,147 the Third Circuit 
reasoned that the Federal Reserve Act’s “at-pleasure” provision en-
tirely148 preempts state laws that fail to “exactly match” their federal 
counterparts.149 Plaintiff Fasano, pursuing claims under New Jersey 
 
 140 Id. at *7. 
 141 No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995). 
 142 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 (LEXIS 2018). 
 143 Katsiavelos v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1995). 
 144 Id. at *2; accord White v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 660 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1995) (agreeing with Katsiavelos and holding that plaintiff’s state law claim of handicapped 
discrimination was not preempted by the Federal Reserve Act). 
 145 Katsiavelos, No. 93 C 7724, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603, at *2. 
 146 Id. Contra Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We hold 
that the Federal Reserve Act precludes enforcement against a federal reserve bank of an employ-
ment contract that would compromise its statutory power to dismiss at pleasure, and prevents the 
development of a reasonable expectation of continued employment.”). 
 147 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 148 Compare id. at 290 (“There is simply no way to give full effect to [ ] state laws while picking 
and choosing which parts of them may apply.”) with Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.2d at 987–
88, 989 (holding that only actual inconsistencies in state laws are preempted rather than entire 
provisions). 
 149 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290; cf. Mele, 359 F.3d at 255 (previously holding the “at-pleasure” 
provision of the Federal Reserve Act bars all contractual employment claims against a Federal 
Reserve Bank; however, leaving unresolved whether preemption extends to statutory employment 
claims). 
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law, alleged she was fired by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 
retaliation for complaining about illegal activity and that the bank 
failed to accommodate her disability.150 As it “wad[ed] into murky wa-
ters,” the Third Circuit explicitly rejected both the Sixth Circuit’s Ana 
Leon T.151 approach and the substantive-mirror approach adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit in Kroske.152 Developing its own, self-described “par-
tial preemption” approach, the Third Circuit requires that, to avoid 
preemption, state laws must “exactly match” their federal counterparts 
because the court will not “pare back” state law to match federal law.153 
Ultimately, despite the fact that federal law and New Jersey law both 
covered Fasano’s causes of action, because the courts had not identically 
interpreted the remedies of Fasano’s state claims, her claims were 
preempted in their entirety.154 
Similarly, in Crowe v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,155 the 
Eastern District of Missouri adopted the Third Circuit’s approach, de-
termining that “broad state employment laws cannot apply to the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks when those state laws prohibit those acts that are 
incident to Federal Reserve Banks dismissing ‘at pleasure’ their em-
ployees, within the bounds of the [Americans with Disabilities Act.]”156 
In doing so, the court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that would have al-
lowed him to seek additional remedies under state law beyond those 
allowed for under federal law.157 
VI. FEDERALISM IN THE ERA OF #METOO 
A “wide split in authority” exists158 and continues to grow with little 
evidence that the Supreme Court will enter the fray.159 At one extreme, 
the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that personnel dismissed 
 
 150 These claims respectively fall under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Act, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 et seq. (2018), and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 10:5-1 et seq. (2018). Federal law prohibits retaliation against bank employees complaining of 
illegal conduct. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(j) (2012). It also prohibits employers from discrimination on the 
basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012). 
 151 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 152 432 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 153 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 290. 
 154 Id. 
 155 No. 4:08CV1057 HEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3427 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 2009) 
 156 Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157 Id. at *4. 
 158 Fasano, 457 F.3d at 279. 
 159 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1655 
(2016); Fasano, 457 F.3d 274, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007); Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006); Ana. Leon T. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Chi., 823 F.2d 928 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). 
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“at pleasure” may only pursue federal law claims against a bank gov-
erned by the Bank Acts.160 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit holds that a 
state anti-discrimination statute must “substantively mirror” federal 
anti-discrimination law to avoid dismissal.161 And the Third Circuit 
falls somewhere in between, requiring that the state regulation “exactly 
match” federal law.162 
The “starting presumption” is that Congress did not intend for fed-
eral law to preempt state law.163 Instead, any “[c]onsideration of issues 
arising under the Supremacy Clause ‘start[s] with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by 
. . . [the] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”164 And of course, no provision of the Bank Acts expressly 
preempts state law. Moreover, courts consistently hold that federal law 
does not “preempt the field” of state employment law.165 Consequently, 
courts must rely on conflict preemption to resolve the preemption ques-
tion posed by an application of the Bank Acts. 
Preemption is “fundamentally a question of congressional intent” 
that requires statutory interpretation.166 As commentators have noted, 
the National Bank Act, which the subsequent Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” 
language is modeled from, was passed “to create a market for loans of 
the general government” and to facilitate the “issu[ance] and circulation 
of a currency based upon the credit of the government.”167 But why Con-
gress included the “at-pleasure” provision in the National Bank Act re-
mains a mystery; Congress did not mention the provision in any rec-
orded debates.168 
 
 160 Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 491 (11th Cir. 2015); Schweikert v. Bank of Am., 
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 163 N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 
(1995). 
 164 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
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Bank Act”). 
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Considering the National Bank Act’s purpose at face value, that 
purpose, or any other purpose alleged by commentators,169 does not ex-
pressly indicate an intent to preclude a plaintiff’s ability to pursue state 
claims. One early source, written thirty years after the National Bank 
Act’s passage, suggests the “at-pleasure” provision was purposed to pre-
vent banks from entering into fixed-term contracts to preserve their 
ability to remove qualifying personnel who had lost the public’s trust.170 
Assuming the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose is to protect public 
trust, as many argue,171 permitting the Bank Acts to prohibit state law 
sex discrimination claims, especially in the #MeToo era, arguably un-
dermines that purpose. And a bank’s ability to fire untrustworthy per-
sonnel is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by most state anti-discrimina-
tion regulations, as the bank remains subject to federal anti-
discrimination law. 
Nonetheless, some courts are rightfully reluctant to tinker with the 
“at-pleasure” provisions’ preemptive capabilities. As Evans articulated: 
subjecting the federal reserve banks to state employment laws 
and regulations which broaden the rights and remedies availa-
ble under federal law will subject the federal reserve banks, and 
possibly their employees, to a myriad of different laws and reg-
ulations which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.172 
Not only would doing so violate the plain text of the “at-pleasure” 
provisions, but, if the provisions’ purpose to maintain public trust is to 
be believed, it would frustrate the alleged intent of Congress “to allow 
the [qualifying] banks the ‘greatest latitude possible’ in terminating 
employees.”173 Furthermore, accidental frustration of purpose is not the 
only reason courts should be reluctant to tinker with the provisions. 
 
 169 See Achtenberg, supra note 22, at 176; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking 
Sys., 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Histor-
ical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983). 
 170 See Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he purpose of the 
[‘at-pleasure’ dismissal] provision in the National Bank Act was to give those institutions the 
greatest latitude possible to hire and fire their chief operating officers, in order to maintain the 
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 171 Westervelt, 76 F. 118 at 122; see also Mackey, 867 F.2d at 526. 
 172 Evans v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., No. 03-4975, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at *17 
(E.D. Pa. July 8, 2004). 
 173 Id. at *17–18 (citing Mackey, 867 F.2d at 526); see also Talbott v. Silver Bow Cty., 139 U.S. 
438, 35 (1891) (noting Congress designed the National Bank Act to create a national banking sys-
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When interpreting a statute, the “starting point must be the language 
employed by Congress, and [the Court] assume[s] that the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”174 By 
this canon, “at pleasure,” with no qualifications, speaks for itself. Under 
the provisions’ “straightforward statutory command, there is no reason 
to resort to legislative history.”175 But even disregarding this canon, one 
can only resort to legislative history to little avail since Congress left no 
record of the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose.176 
No court, and few judges,177 dispute that banks governed by the 
Bank Acts are subject to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other federal anti-
discrimination statutes. Preemption only occurs where the federal and 
state laws conflict so that it is “impossible . . . to comply with both”178 or 
where state law stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives underlying the federal law.”179 
Yet the Ninth Circuit takes this a step further, stating in Kroske that 
“in the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary . . . Kroske’s 
claim of age discrimination under the Washington Law Against Dis-
crimination is not preempted by [the National Bank Act], as limited by 
the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act].”180 
Surely the last-in-time rule181 amends the Bank Acts to the “mini-
mum extent necessary” to resolve any conflict with federal anti-discrim-
ination laws.182 However, the “minimum extent necessary” cannot logi-
cally include rights and remedies beyond those allowed for by federal 
law. Repeal or amendment may only occur if “the two acts are in irrec-
oncilable conflict, or [if] the later statute covers the whole ground occu-
pied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it.”183 The 
“at-pleasure” provisions provide qualifying banks the absolute, unlim-
ited power to dismiss certain employees. Conversely, Title VII and other 
federal anti-discrimination laws prohibit such banks from dismissing 
 
 174 Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citations and internal quotation marks 
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 178 English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 179 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 180 432 F.3d 976, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 822 (2006). 
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employees under certain conditions.184 Therefore, any unconditioned 
right to dismiss granted by the “at-pleasure” provisions is made illegal. 
That is, to the extent that federal anti-discrimination laws irreconcila-
bly conflict with the “at-pleasure” provisions, those laws impliedly 
amend the Bank Acts to grant the qualifying banks “a limited power to 
dismiss [qualifying personnel] at pleasure.”185 
Despite any implied amendments, state causes of action remain 
barred even though some federal statutes contain provisions known as 
“saving clauses,” which preserve state laws.186 The “double saving 
clause” argument holds that the “at-pleasure” provisions do not 
preempt federal anti-discrimination laws containing saving provisions, 
and in turn, those federal anti-discrimination laws do not preempt state 
anti-discrimination laws.187 But the Supreme Court has dismissed such 
reasoning.188 Federal laws containing a saving clause do not transform 
state laws into federal laws that are saved from preemption.189 Further-
more, because Title VII and many other federal laws contain such non-
preemption provisions, applied to all state laws with which they do not 
conflict, and taken to its logical extreme, the double saving clause argu-
ment would protect almost all state laws from preemption by the “at-
pleasure” provisions.190 
As the Supreme Court explained, “[o]rdinarily, state causes of ac-
tion are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and 
above that authorized by federal law.”191 Yet the “at-pleasure” provi-
sions remain plain, blanket prohibitions on state law to the contrary.192 
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the double saving clause argument, taken to its logical extreme would save almost all state laws 
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Thus, as observed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, the “at-
pleasure” provisions preempt any state anti-discrimination law that 
contradicts them.193 Courts should not “rewrite the statute to reflect a 
meaning” they “deem more desirable.”194 Under the retail approach, 
courts fail to “give full effect to . . . state laws [by] picking and choosing 
which parts of them may apply,”195 and consequently, courts replace any 
“absence of legislative intent” with their own.196 In Fasano v. Federal 
Reserve Board of New York,197 the Third Circuit demonstrated the prob-
lems with such an approach: 
For example . . . the [state law] does not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies; a plaintiff elects whether to proceed in 
the administrative arena, or in court, but a final decision in ei-
ther forum is binding and renders the other forum unavailable. 
Were we to graft the [Americans with Disabilities Act]’s exhaus-
tion requirement onto the [state law], we would transform for-
merly final, binding administrative determinations into non-
binding preliminaries to litigation. We will not step on the toes 
of the New Jersey legislature in this or any other like manner.198 
Not only does Kroske’s reasoning step on the toes of state legisla-
tures, it also disregards Congress’ intent—whatever it was—when en-
acting the National Bank Act’s “at-pleasure” provision, and its intent 
when enacting subsequent Bank Acts that purposely and deliberately 
borrowed that same language.199 Instead, by looking to the ordinary 
meaning, courts can avoid “rewriting” state laws “to parrot Federal 
anti-discrimination law” as occurs under the retail approach.200 Such 
reasoning is not only faithful to the plain language, but also to Title VII 
and other federal anti-discrimination laws, impliedly repealing the 
Bank Acts only to the extent necessary to give effect to those laws, and 
no further. 
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Moreover, the total preemption approach allows for the efficient 
administration and governance of qualifying banks because anti-dis-
crimination laws are then applied to them uniformly across the coun-
try.201 Conferring qualifying personnel different rights and remedies 
“would frustrate the ability of the national banks to make crucial em-
ployment decisions, ultimately undermining confidence in the national 
banking system.”202 While Congress’ original intent for including the 
“at-pleasure” provision is unknown and relies on speculation, this effi-
ciency argument furthers the purpose of the National Bank Act, and 
subsequent acts, as a whole by giving full effect to the language em-
ployed by Congress. 
Adopting this approach—that the Bank Acts preempt all state laws 
prohibiting the at-will dismissal of qualifying personnel—still demands 
congressional action. Although Title VII affords plaintiffs alleging sex 
discrimination a meaningful remedy, Congress should narrow the “at-
pleasure” provisions’ scope. In the era of #MeToo and other anti-dis-
criminatory movements, it would be wise to eliminate barriers to pur-
suing sex discrimination claims. Congress should proceed cautiously, 
however, as undesirable consequences may accompany such duplicative 
claims. For example, allowing for state law remedies to discrimination 
may “dissuade[] employers from executing lawful and economically nec-
essary terminations” because such terminations might be characterized 
as discriminatory “and could subject employers to more time-intensive 
and expensive litigation.”203The Third Circuit’s approach, articulated in 
Fasano v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,204 avoids such problems 
because entities governed by the Bank Acts, while subject to both state 
and federal anti-discrimination law, are subject to only one set of 
claims: those arising under federal anti-discrimination law and state 
anti-discrimination law to the extent that the state law “exactly 
match[es]” the federal law.205 By adopting this approach, Congress 
would neither unknowingly disturb any of the alleged purposes of the 
Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions, nor would Congress fail to give 
state laws their full effect by allowing courts to pick and choose which 
various provisions of state laws to apply.206 This remains faithful to
 Congress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the 
Bank Acts, while effectuating the purposes of state anti-discrimination 
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laws to the extent that they are consistent with federal law. Such an 
approach bolsters anti-discrimination protections by expanding the 
number of options207 available to those harmed while protecting Con-
gress’ purpose for including the “at-pleasure” provisions in the Bank 
Acts and without butchering the intent of state legislatures. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits adopt the correct reading 
and application of the Bank Acts’ “at-pleasure” provisions.208 Their ap-
proach is not only true to the plain meaning of the provisions’ words, 
but also to Congress’ purpose for including the provisions in the acts—
whatever that purpose may be.209 Moreover, their approach respects 
legislative intent by giving full effect to state laws without picking and 
choosing which portions of those laws should apply. 
But in the #MeToo era, Congress need not settle for this interpre-
tation. Instead, Congress can remain faithful to both federal and state 
legislative intent while strengthening anti-discrimination regulations. 
To do so, Congress should adopt the Third Circuit’s wholesale preemp-
tion approach,210 providing that the Bank Acts do not preempt state 
anti-discrimination laws to the extent that the state laws “exactly 
match” federal laws.211 Such an approach does not remove the “at-pleas-
ure” provisions from law, leaving them to serve whatever purpose they 
may. And in preserving the provisions, it bolsters plaintiffs’ ability to 
seek anti-discrimination relief by providing them with matching state 
law options to pursue. Consequently, the Third Circuit’s approach in-
creasingly deters qualifying banks from engaging in discrimination 
while respecting the “at-pleasure” provisions’ purpose. 
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